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The Songs of Other Birds 
ANYA BERNSTEIN 
"This stuff about Taipei is very interesting," David Engel told me when we 
first met, "but wouldn't things look roughly the same in Chicago?" We were 
discussing my work on Taiwanese government administrators' attitudes toward 
the laws they administered.' These attitudes were, in short, not positive. 
Administrators were apt to treat law and legal process as an impediment to 
their work, not a driver of it. When they did invoke the law, they often did so 
for external, non-Taiwanese audiences. Pulling law on compatriots was liable 
to be interpreted - by administrators and laypeople alike - as a cover-up for a 
b:i~ld power play. 
David phrased his question in a half-joking way, with "Chicago" standing 
loosely for a government administration that distributed benefits on the basis of 
political affiliations and loyalties rather than legal entitlements. But he was, 
of course, posing deeper questions. Wasn't the most parsimonious explanation of 
1 Anya Bernstein, "The social life of regulation in Taipei City Hall: the role of legality in the 
administrative bureaucracy," Law 6 Social Inquiry, 33 (2oo8), 925-54. I spent roughly nine 
months working with administrators in the Taipei City Government Bureau of Urban 
Development, including six months as a full-time volunteer translator in the Bureau's City Hall 
office. During this time, I talked with administrators; sat in on their meetings with other 
government employees, consultants, and members of the public; and accompanied them on 
inspections, off.,site meetings, lunch outings, weekend hikes, dinners, and other activities. 
I observed hundreds of meetings and less formal interactions, and had hundreds of 
conversations with administrators from across the Bureau, as well as from other departments. 
I also recorded roughly thirty hours of open-ended, semi-structured interviews with 
administrators at every level of the organization, from Bureau head to low-level functionary. 
Before working in the city government, I spent roughly one year doing ethnography with 
community activists in the Dali Street neighborhood, one of the oldest, poorest, and most 
crowded in Taipei. My ethnographic work took place in Chinese (mostly Mandarin, with some 
Taiwanese). I render Mandarin quotations in hanyu pinyin transliteration (without tones). 
Where I do not have exact wording, I give the gist of an utterance in English translation only. 
I use pseudonyms for all speakers. 
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administrators' distaste for law simply that law would obstruct their ability to 
wield power? And didn't my findings in Taiwan simply replicate what others had 
found elsewhere- that many people do not like to invoke legal process? After all, 
David's own research had found that people purposely avoided recourse to 
the law in places as different as northern Thailand and middle America.z 
The impulse to see similarities or differences across cases is sometimes 
glossed as a matter of preference: lumping versus splitting. From that perspec-
tive, the decision is mostly a question of whether one attends more to what 
unites or what divides. Here, I want to explore a different dimension to 
difference and similarity. Drawing on my own work in Taiwan, I want to raise 
some questions about how we determine what seemingly similar phenomena 
mean in, and for, their surrounding social contexts. This means thinking 
explicitly about how we situate what we encounter in our research. It may 
be that lumping and splitting are not so much different ways of understanding 
phenomena as of contextualizing them. 
When seen at higher levels of abstraction or generality, attitudes toward law 
among Taipei administrators, American farmers, and Thai migrants can 
indeed be described as similar. When viewed at a more specific and concrete 
level, situated within geographically, temp'orally, and culturally more proxim-
ate contexts, these same attitudes can appear quite distinct. Not every·bird that 
mistrusts the law sings the same song. And any song rings in a chorus of other 
chirps. This suggests, as Carol Greenhouse has written, that the study oflaw in 
society is always at least implicitly comparative.3 We compare our object of 
study with how we imagined it would be, with surrounding objects in the same 
social field, with separate objects that we know or imagine, and with what we 
see at other levels of generality. Here, I dive into some local contexts to unwrap 
the distinct significance of people's attitudes about laws and the governments 
that supply them, then swim back up to consider what implications this might 
have for the study of legal consciousness across times and places. 
COMPLEXITY, COHERENCE, AND DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS 
Systems of governance are highly topicalized in Taiwan. Before even reaching 
the question of what people think about democracy, one is struck by how 
• See, e.g., David M. Engel, "The ovenbird's song: insiders, outsiders, and personal injuries in 
an American community," Law 6 Society Review, 18 (1984), 551-82; David M. Engel, 
"Globalization and the decline of legal consciousness: torts, ghosts, and karma in Thailand," 
Law 6 Social Inquiry, 30 (zoos), 469-54· 
3 Carol Greenhouse, "Courting difference: issues of interpretation and comparison in the study 
of legal ideologies," Law 6 Society Review, 22 (1988), 687-708. 
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actively many people are thinking about it. It was not a topic that flared up 
among political junkies or during elections. In an intensely social environ-
ment, people in every class and group I encountered routinely discussed the 
nature of Taiwan's democracy, the quality of its political culture, and the 
relationship of its contemporary state to its martial law past. 
This did not mean, of course, that people were satisfied with their nation, 
government, or legal system. On the contrary, the political conversation that 
suffused social life was characterized by an often gloomy dissatisfaction. 
Common themes were instability, incoherence, and multiplicity. Many 
people described Taiwan's problems as rooted in an unmanageable multifari-
ousness that had been exacerbated with the advent of democracy. 
One urban planning administrator, for instance, explained to me that, after 
the end of martial law and the reintroduction of city government elections to 
Taipei, the city's Bureau of Urban Development had ceased doing large-scale 
social research on the city it administered.4 The main reason, Mr. An said, was 
that Taiwanese society was just too complicated (fuza). There were too many 
kinds of people doing too many kinds of things, and one simply couldn't 
capture it all in a survey. Indeed, the city government itself was complicated. 
The urban planning department was riven with conflicts between graduates of 
its two main feeder schools: a Marxist department that emphasized qualitative 
research and a systems-theoretical one that favored statistical methods. And 
relations among branches of government had become complicated with the 
introduction of elected mayors and city councils. The department head now 
had to. please the mayor, the public, the city council, and the experts and 
scholars incorporated into many decision-making processes - a complicated set 
of demands that left little time or political capital for comprehensive planning.s 
In contrast, Mr. An continued, America was "more danchun (pure, 
simple)." In America, he explained, warring factions would be separated, 
departments had stable duties that endured across administrations, elected 
representatives would not put pressure on administrators, and even the 
4 Before democratization, Taipei had elected mayors from 1947 ~ntil1967. In 1967 the central 
government began appointing mayors after a candidate who did not belong to the ruling party 
(the KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) won a second term. See Shelley Rigger, Politics in 
Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge, 1999). 
5 As Jeffrey Martin writes with respect to the police, "Taiwanese policing elevates the network-
based powers of ... local elites [such as city councils] over the powers of centralized 
bureaucracies and the courts, even as it effectively upholds the ultimate authority of a 
democratically organized state. In other words, it is democratic policing without the rule of 
law." Jeffrey T. Martin, "Legitimate force in a particularistic democracy: street police and 
outlaw legislators in the Republic of China on Taiwan," Law 6 Social Inquiry, 38 (2013), 
615-42· 617. 
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administrative leadership might stay on from mayor to mayor. In Taipei city 
hall, a word spoken by one person could mean something different in the 
mouth of someone from a competing group. In America, on the other hand, 
whether you read it in the New York Times or the Washington Post, a word 
meant the same thing. In Mr. An's America, thus, differences were clearly 
delineated and compartmentalized, electoral contestation did not lead to 
political instability, and meaning was stable throughout public discourse. This 
kind of contrast with an imagined "America," "the West," or "foreign coun-
tries (guowai)" was not unusual: many of the people with whom I spoke 
framed their comments about their country with their visions of mine, as a 
way to illuminate their ideals and disappointments.6 The simplicity and 
stability attributed to America highlighted Mr. An's negative convictions about 
the complexity and instability of Taiwan. 
Fuza, complexity, is a key term of discomfort in Taiwan. An unsolvable 
situation might be fuza, but so might social configurations and demographic 
arrangements. For instance, many people described the community activists 
I studied as living in a very fuza area of the city. Some people explained their 
use of this term with reference to the gangsters and prostitutes for which the 
area is famous. But most explanations had something to do with diversity. 
"Lower middle classes, middle classes, upper classes, it has them all," one 
acquaintance said.7 Ms. Yuan used a classical idiom meaning "dragons and 
snakes live together there." In such a place, she explained, everything is all 
mixed up: Dragons and snakes are the most opposite creatures. One person 
wove both explanations together. The area's well-known sex industry, and the 
gangsters that go along with it, led to there being many different types of 
people in the neighborhood - qaturally a very fuza situation. 
As others have shown, the notion oL "diversity" can serve ideological 
purposes beyond mere description. In the United States, it can obscure 
structural inequalities in circumstance and opportunity with an upbeat insist-
ence on the value of difference.8 The valenct; of multiplicity in Taiwanese 
political discourse is quite different. A diversity of social types or opinions is 
often figured as inherently problematic, almost unnatural: fuza, an unsolvable 
situation. This discomfort with multiplicity, which was prevalent both in my 
fieldsites and among other acquaintances, often had a distinctly historical 
6 I assume that many such references were made specifically for my benefit, since people knew 
I came from the United States. However, such contrasts were also common in conversations 
among administrators, for instance at meetings where I was not a central participant. 
7 "Zhongdi jieji, zhongceng jieji, gaoceng jieji, dou you." 
8 Ellen Berrey, The Enigma of Diversity (University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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implication. It brought the contemporary democratic period into sharp con-
trast with the long martial law era that preceded it. Martial law, with its well-
controlled media and its strict limits on political participation, enforced a 
stability of meaning and value in political discourse. Its monopoly over the 
public sphere limited what could be openly asserted to be the public good. 
The martial law government implemented this monopoly on legitimate 
ideology while also supporting a lively system of political competition. Martial 
law politics divided local factions, which were open to all, from national party 
politics, which was restricted by ethnicity, biography, and personal relations.9 
Local-level elections gave people seeking control of resources a way to organ-
ize and compete with others. Local factions were further connected to central 
power brokers, creating a "regime patronage system" - that is, a system in 
which the regime itself was a patron in a clientelist system.10 Local elites in 
turn became patrons at the local level, transferring resources to local clients 
who lent them political support. This large-scale system kept factions balanced 
without disturbing centralized party control. 11 
9 Joseph Bosco, "Taiwan factions: guanxi, patronage, and the state in local politics," Ethnology, 
31 (199~), 157-84. The KMT (Guomindang or Chinese Nationalist Party) took control of 
Taiwan after World War II, when the Allies ended Japan's fifty-year colonization of the island 
(1895-1945). In 1949, the KMT leadership, along with many others, fled to Taiwan, away from 
the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war. For many years, Taiwan's national politics 
was reserved for those who came to island in the 1940s and their descendants, waishengren 
(outside-the-province people, or Mainlanders in English). See Steven E. Phillips, Between 
Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter With Nationalist China, 1945-1950 
(Stanford University Press, ~003). After a massive, bloody reprisal against a protest of police 
power, the party state instituted a martial law whose rule would last forty years: George H. Kerr, 
Fonnosa Betrayed (Houghton Mifflin, 1965). In the late 1970s, the government began to 
"localize" (bentuhua), increasing the number of people descended from those who had come 
to the island before Japanese colonization in 1895 - the benshengren (this-province people) or 
Taiwanese, who had previously been relegated to local factional politics. This process played a 
key role in both facilitating democratization and preserving the KMT's legitimacy: Allen 
Chun, "Democracy as hegeiJlony, globalization as indigenization, or the 'culture' in 
Taiwanese national politics" in Wei-Chin Lee (ed.), Taiwan in Perspective (Brill, 2ooo), 
pp. 7-27. Taiwanese make up 84-85.5 percent of the island's population; Mainlanders 13-14 
percent; and indigenous people q-2 percent: Government Information Office, Taiwan 
Yearbook 2003 (Government Information Office, Republic of China, 2003); Shuanfan Huang, 
"A sociolinguistic profile of Taipei" in Robert L. Cheng and Shuanfan Huang (eds.), The 
Structure of Modem Taiwanese: A Modem Synthesis (Xiandai Taiwanhua Yanjiu Lunwenji) 
(Crane, 1988), pp. 301-31. In my view, the ethnicized distinctions that fueled politics in the 
twentieth century are waning in importance as more young people grow up in the democratic 
system. 
10 Nai-teh Wu, The Politics of a Regime Patronage System: Mobilization and Control Within an 
Authoritarian Regime. Unpublished PhD diss. University of Chicago (1987). 
11 Ibid; Edwin A. Winckler, "Roles linking state and society" in Emily Martin Ahern and Hill 
Gates (eds.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society (Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. so-88; 
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The language and forms of traditional soci~l values helped naturalize this 
new political system. Political factions under martial law built on pre-existing 
ways of cohering social groups: real and fictive kinship, locality, educational 
background, occupational affiliation, and religious participation. u Utilizing a 
common social valorization of affective links and long-term relations of 
mutual aid and obligation, factions helped make the personal indistinguish-
able from the political: "As the entrepreneurs collect money, the politicians 
collect friends."'3 Ideological claims like assertions about the common good 
were reserved for the ruling KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party, with its 
unified front of a tightly organized authoritarian system.'4 
External pressures from the international community's transfer of recogni-
tion to the People's Republic of China in the 1970s, and internal pressures 
from emergent opposition political groups in the 198os, supported a vibrant 
democratization movement. That movement itself utilized the very channels 
that had sustained local factions under martial law: interpersonally mediated 
social networks based on pre-existing tropes of affiliation.'5 These personalistic 
networks sustained groups whose members were connected both by personal 
relations and by an understanding of themselves as participants in a discourse 
that exceeds those relations- a political faction, party, or movement. With the 
democratization movement, politically active participants began insinuating 
new ideological content into these pre-existing social networks.'6 
Many people described the rise of this ideological pluralism with mixed 
feelings. Democratization opened up channels of political power and allowed 
people to express their views freely and in their preferred languages.'7 But that 
Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third 
Wave (M. E. Sharpe, 1996). 
u See Rigger, Politics in Taiwan. 13 Wu, Politics of a Regime Patronage System, 265. 
'4 See Bosco, Taiwan Factions. 
' 5 Ibid; Rigger, Politics in Taiwan; Susan Greenhalgh, "Networks and their nodes: urban society 
on Taiwan," The China Quarterly, 99 (1984), 529-52; see also David L. Wank, Commodifying 
Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in 
China (Cornell University Press, 1994). 
'
6 Pictures from the wedding of a founder of the then-opposition Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), for instance, show a veritable Orient Express of the early political underground: 
A group of people who all just happened to be opposition activists all just happened to gather 
for this happy occasion, at a time when gathering for other reasons just happened to be 
prohibited. Martial law strictures prohibited large gatherings of people except for certain ritual 
events like weddings, so opposition activists seized on the personalistic connections that gave 
rise to such exceptions. As the founder's ex-wife told me, "DPP history starts at my wedding." 
1
7 Anya Bernstein, "Bureaucratic speech: language choice and democratic identity in the Taipei 
bureaucracy," PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 40 (2017), 31-34. 
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freedom also threw the very definition of the public good into question. For 
many people I talked to, this discursive disarray was the undesirable underside 
of democracy. 
Even beneficiaries of the new cacophony often expressed discomfort with 
the freedoms that democratization fostered. Mr. Shan was a community 
activist who had participated for years in protests against the city government. 
These activities would have landed him in jail during the martial law period. 
Nonetheless, he told me with disgust that the difference that democratization 
had made was that now, in the post-martial law era, "it is easier to be a 
gangster."'8 Another devoted activist, Mother Mei, had also spent years 
engaging in protests and other activities that were strictly prohibited under 
martial law. She once summed up a dinner conversation with the comment, 
"Taiwan is too democratic."'9 After a pause, she burst out, "[People] even cuss 
out the president!'"0 
Administrators, meanwhile, generally spoke favorably of the effects of dem-
ocratization on relations between government employees and the populace 
under their purview.2 ' But they consistently expressed discomfort with the 
unstable quality of government practice it brought about. They especially 
pointed to the destabilizing effects of elections. By making control of the city 
government unpredictable, elections had made long-term planning impos-
sible. Elections in other cities similarly obstructed regional planning. For the 
first time, neighboring urban areas could be controlled by different parties, 
making cooperation politically unpalatable. And the new powers of the 
elected Taipei City Council impeded the implementation of law and policy. 
In Taiwan's highly personalistic electoral structure, each councilor was con-
sidered somewhat beholden to each constituent. And the City Council con-
trolled the city government's budget. Administrators thus spent much of their 
time fielding elected representatives' demands to abrogate the rule of law: to 
protect particular constituents from the enforcement of city policies. 
The newly opened stage for ideological assertions of the public good, along 
with election-induced turmoil in government, contributed to the destabilizing 
diversity of the post-martial law era. As Mr. Wei, a high-ranking administrator, 
told me, Taipei could be considered: 
'
8 "Jieyan gen jieyan de butong? Jieyan hou zuo liumang bijiao hao." 
'9 "Taiwan tai minzhu /e." Aside from some friends who self-identified as unusual -by sexual 
activity (e.g., gay men, women who were openly sexually active); profession (e.g., independent 
filmmakers, actors, writers); and upbringing or experience (e.g., people who had lived long-
term in the United States, Australia, or Europe)- members of every group I came into contact 
with in Taiwan expressed this sentiment to me, often in these exact words. 
20 "Dou rna zongtong eil" 21 See Bernstein, Bureaucratic Speech. 
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the world's freest city ... What I mean is, it seems like America is very free but 
it ... does still have a dominant culture ... [In] Taipei ... ifi think I have the 
ability, then I just do it, so it turns out [that] ... everybody does his own 
thing ... Well this is ... also one of the origins of Taipei's ... fun and 
interesting style. From the perspective of Said's Orientalism, of course, this is 
one of Asia's fascinating aspects, but it's also our predicament. Because this 
interesting style has been developed by different groups each acting on its 
own ... This may be our particular characteristic, but we still feel that ... this 
kind of characteristic isn't a good characteristic.22 
Mr. Wei's description of social conduct could have come straight from 
Adam Smith: In Taipei's free society, each person pursues his or her own 
interests independently. But the evaluation of the result was quite different. 
This self-motivated pursuit of interests does not redound, willy-nilly, to the 
benefit of the whole society. Rather, it gives rise to something more compli-
cated. It creates a city that is "fascinating" and "interesting" to outsiders but 
which suffers from a "predicament": the lack of the "dominant culture" that 
characterizes a hypothetical America. 
Such lack of cultural coherence is commonly tied to the end of authoritar-
ian rule. For instance, Mr. Ke, an active and enthusiastic administrator, spoke 
proudly of his ability to negotiate with members of the public, demonstrate 
his earnestness and rectitude, and forge mutually beneficial compromises.'3 
But he also admitted that he sometimes missed the uncomplicated ideological 
commitments that had pervaded his youth. Under martial law, he told me, 
"it was all about 'establishing the nation.' Everyone didn't dare talk politics. 
We just dared to talk about 'establishing the nation.' After martial law, wha,t 
did we get? We got freedom of speech. But the thing we sacrificed was even 
more important."24 
These might sound like the complaints of power-hungry bureaucrats who 
wish people would fall in line like they used to. But as I hope I have 
., "Quanshijieshang zui ziyoude chengshi ... Wode yisi shi kanqilai Meiguo hen ziyou keshi ta ... 
you wenhua qiangshide neihanbufen cunzai. Taibei ... wo renwei woyou zhege nengli, wo jiu 
zuo, suoyi hui biancheng ... zijiqiao zijide, ah suoyi ... zhe ... yeshi jintian Taibei nage 
youqude fengmude laiyuan zhiyi ... Zhege ... cong Said de Dongfangzhuyi laijiang dehua 
dangranshi yige Y azhou de meili suozaide, dans hi zhe ye shi women de kunjing. Yinwei 
zhezhong youqude fengmuxing you butong qunti gezi fazhan chansheng de ... Zhe yexu shi 
womende tese keshi women haishi juede zhege tese ... bushi yige haode tese." 
•3 On the importance of compromise to government action, see Anya Bernstein, The Social Life 
of Regulation. 
"4 "Nage shihou dou shi jianguo, dajia bu gan tan zhengzhi, zhi gan tan jianguo. Jieyan ne, 
women dedaole shenme? Women dedaole yanlun ziyou, keshi women sunshi de dongxi geng 
zhongyao." 
The Songs of Other Birds 227 
demonstrated, the sentiment was a common refrain among people outside the 
government, too. A small-scale entrepreneur in his early thirties who took 
me on a walk around his neighborhood, for instance, spent much of the 
time bemoaning the sorry state of Taiwanese culture and society. As we passed 
the fortune-tellers plying their trade outside a famous temple, he remarked 
that such old-fashioned, superstitious practices were still rampant in Taiwan. 
In a busy market area, he derided the Taiwanese obsession with fashion and 
the ephemeral nature of Taiwanese trends. Outside a movie theater, he 
complained that Taiwanese directors prefer incomprehensibility over relat-
ability. Taiwan's cultural problem, he concluded, is that it has no culture.25 
Like administrators in the city government, my companion faulted Taiwan 
for its loss of a unitary, coherent identity - something one could point to and 
call one's own.26 Many people posed, in their own ways, the disheartened 
question of the ovenbird's song: "what to make of a diminished thing?"27 
LAW IS NOT THE ANSWER 
As the previous section makes clear, American academics are not the only ones 
who might see sociolegal analysis as inherently comparative. Many Taiwanese 
people that I knew used comparisons with the United States as a way to portray 
what an ideally functional democracy might look like. As their references to 
simplicity, stability, and dominant culture imply, this ideal included freedom 
balanced by coherence. Moreover, the strength of American democracy 
seemed, for many, to inhere not in things like commitments to the rule of 
law or procedural rights, but in cultural constraints and structural controls 
that could hold in check a potentially disorderly diversity. Such disorder was 
'5 This person also brought a comparative approach to our conversation. I proposed another way 
to sum up the phenomena he described: As a diverse society, Taiwan•supports a vibrant ritual 
tradition along with a cosmopolitan incorporation of f9reign aesthetics and a lively arts scene. 
Yes, he sighed, an American would say that. Americans are confident. Taiwanese, he explained, 
are too down on themselves to ever think that way. 
' 6 To be sure, not everyone wishes Taiwan were more uniform. Some people I knew used the 
same lamentational style to bemoan Taiwanese society's lack of diversity. Notably, however, 
I only heard this relatively uncommon view of multiplicity expressed by people who described 
themselves as somewhat unusual in their behaviors, professions, or experiences (seen 19 of this 
chapter). 
'7 I refer here, of course, both to the poem by Robert Frost and to David Engel's reference to it in 
his article "The O,ven Bird's Song." Robert Frost, "The Oven Bird" in The Poetry of Robert 
Frost, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1969 [1916]); Engel, The Oven 
Bird's Song. 
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then figured as released in Taiwan with the fragmentation of the previously 
presumable cultural unity enforced under martiallaw.28 
Furthermore, the transition from martial law to democracy left in place 
many ideas about how the general will is expressed and how the general good 
is fulfilled. Taiwanese education, for instance, has long emphasized appropri-
ate behavior by model individuals as a motivating force in social develop-
ment.29 This notion continues to be prevalent in discussions of politics: 
People in Taiwan talk much more about the power of exemplary individuals 
than about the benevolence of invisible hands. As Mr. Wei's description of 
Taipei as an excessively free city suggests, the notion that political equilibrium 
could be achieved through the combination of otherwise uncoordinated 
activities by self-interested individuals would have seemed quite strange to 
most people with whom I spoke. A society in which each person acts in his 
own interest would result not in the fulfillment of world spirit moving through 
history, but in chaos.3° 
'
8 My aim here is to explain people's understandings of their society, not to evaluate their 
accuracy. Still, it may be worth mentioning that Taipei was rated one of the safest cities in the 
world by The Economist magazine in 2015. See http://safecities.economist.com/whitepapers/ 
safe-cities-index-white-paper/. In other words, perceptions of disorder likely did not refer to 
things like crime waves or violent unrest in the wake of democratization, but to more complex, 
nuanced understandings of social structure and cultural values. 
'9 In his study of Taiwanese elementary schools, done around the time when a number of my 
informants were in school, Richard Wilson noted that children typically asserted that any group 
needs a leader to act as a model for its members. Richard W. Wilson, Learning to Be Chinese: 
The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan (1970). This value can loosely be seen to 
derive from the Confucian tradition, although of course Confucianism itself has taken many 
forms over the centuries. For more on how loosely Confucian ideals permeate Taiwanese 
concepts of legitimate authority, see Martin, Legitimate Force. 
30 Taiwan's remarkable twentieth-century economic success was similarly rooted in "a system of 
industrial land transfer and development that was tightly controlled by the state" and largely 
funded by the United States. Martha Fitzpatrick Bishai, "The development of industrial land in 
Taiwan: a legal framework for state control," 26 (1991), Journal of Developing Areas, 53-64, 62. 
After giving the KMT about $:z. billion between 1945 and 1949 to fight the Communists, the 
United States cut off aid, "disgusted with [the KMT's] incompetence and insatiable appetite for 
funds that simply vanished": Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle 
(M.E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 53· Then "North Korea's Kim 11-sung entered the story as the [KMT's] 
deus ex machina by invading South Korea," and aid resumed: ibid, 55· Taiwan's mid-century 
land reform, which enabled rapid industrialization by distributing farmland to small 
producers and encouraging large landlords to urbanize and invest, proceeded under the 
auspices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Sino-American 
Joint Council on Rural Reconstruction, a US-KMT organization. A. Y. C. Koo, Land Reform 
in Taiwan, United States Agency for International Development: Country Papers, Spring 
Review (1970); Alice Amsden, "The state and Taiwan's economic development" in Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In 
(Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 78-106. These agencies provided conduits for the river of 
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One could imagine one way such illegitimate disorder might be tamed: 
through laws passed by democratically elected representatives. But in my three 
years of language study, fieldwork, and intensive socializing, no one ever 
suggested such a possibility. Law was often markedly extraneous to discussions 
of government practice. For instance, shortly before I started my fieldwork, 
agents from the Ministry of Justice raided the offices of a popular magazine 
that was about to publish leaked documents revealing that a former president 
had bypassed the national security apparatus with secret diplomacy and 
espionage funds. I asked the questions that seemed obvious to me: On what 
legal grounds was the magazine shut down? Were the secret funds illegal? 
The teachers and friends with whom I then spent most of my time found these 
questions interesting only in an ethnographic sense, as an illustration of how 
Americans think. They were not relevant to local discussions of the incident, 
which focused on whether publishing such a story actually posed_ a threat to 
national security. 
The notion that law might play a central role in legitimating political action 
or in cohering political positions was similarly dismissed by my fieldwork 
participants. As one urban planning administrator explained to me, Western 
laws grew out of Western social norms, leading to a natural connection 
between legal systems and social realities. In Taiwan, in contrast, laws were 
imported from elsewhere- Japan, Europe, America. That led to a big "gap"-
he used the English word - between law and society. In keeping with this 
image, administrators routinely talked about Taiwanese law as irrelevant and 
non-responsive to the society it purported to regulate, and as "hard (ying)" or 
unyielding in ways that amplified that irrelevance. 
For instance, one administrator with whom I worked dealt with an area 
zoned for agricultural use whose landowners had recently built a plethora of 
consumer-oriented tea-houses. He blamed the laws, not the landowners, for 
the situation. These leisure establishments, he explained, answered a growing 
demand from an increasingly rich populace. The law had been too slow to 
acknowledge this demand; it could not keep up with social changes. Insofar as 
they saw their job as implementing laws at all, administrators tended to phrase 
it in terms of convincing members of the public to come around to legal 
strictures. But for the roost part, administrators did not describe their work in 
US economic aid that flowed into Taiwan with the beginning of the Korean War. They "had de 
facto veto power [over policy] through their control of the [KMT's] economic lifeline": Gold, 
State and Society, 68. They also probably wrote many of the Taiwanese policies on which US aid 
was contingent: Bruce Cumings, 'The origins and development of the northeast Asian political 
economy: industrial sectors, product cycles and political consequences," International 
Organization, 38 (1984), 1-40, 25. 
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these terms in the first place. Rather, they tended to talk about it in terms of 
negotiation and consensus-building. 3' ·· 
Again, this attitude toward law was not limited to government adminis-
trators. When the community activist group with which I worked heard that 
the electric company was to break its pledge nor to enlarge a local electric 
station without residents' agreement, my questions again revealed my own 
assumptions. What was the legal status of that pledge? Had anybody signed 
anything? The people I studied waved aside these irrelevant questions. They 
were busy planning to meet the electric company on the field of public values, 
looking for ways to emotionally connect to government administrators, dem-
onstrate their own sincerity, and convince others of the righteousness of their 
cause. They did not doubt the strength of the state, but they did not speak of 
the state's role in terms of lawsY 
The irrelevance of law to state-society relations emerged even on those 
unusual occasions when laws were invoked for political projects. The activists 
I studied, for instance, originally came together to protest a proposed land sale 
that would create a large retirement home in the already crowded neighbor-
hood. Residents agitated for the land to be converted into a park instead. They 
soon discovered that Taipei's zoning law required a minimum amount of 
green space per capita in residential areas - a requirement that had quite 
obviously not been fulfilled in this crowded neighborhood. Years later, par-
ticipants still chuckled over this coincidence. Administrators also commented 
on the creativity of invoking the law. But neither group treated it as decisive or 
dispositive. Activists never presented the legal stricture as a conclusive basis for 
a demand - a right the law conferred on them by virtue of taking them as its 
object. Rather, they used their adherence to other local values to demonstrate 
that they deserved to benefit from the application of the law. 33 
For instance, activists emphasized their earnest investment in their com-
munity, their emotional relationship with its history, and their contributions to 
the nation. This way of using the law to support a larger claim to desert made 
sense to the government administrators who were the group's primary targets. 
Mr. An, who would be pivotal to the group's success, shrugged: "They used 
the wrong law. I could have given them a better law, if they'd asked me." This 
was a minor objection, though. Choosing the wrong law did not affect either 
3' See Bernstein, The Social life of Regulation, Martin, Legitimate Force. 
3" For a fuller discussion of this process, see Anya Bernstein, "Parameters of legitimation and the 
environmental future of a Taipei neighborhood," in Sylvia Washington et al. (eds.), Echoes 
from the Poisoned Well: Global Memories of Environmental Iniustice (Routledge, :zoo6), 
pp. 311-31. 
33 See ibid. 
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the legitimacy or the efficacy of the group's approach, precisely because the 
law itself was not very important. Rather, it was by showing their comportment 
with broader social values - community cohesion, historical attachment, and 
national contribution -that they justified themselves and got the job done.34 
What those residents were really good at, Mr. An explained with evident 
approval, was moving (gandong) others by showing how united (tuanjie) 
they were. 
This moving unity came into play when activists wanted to go beyond the law 
as well. The proposed park land held two structures built during the Japanese 
colonization ofTaiwan (1895-1945), when the area had grown sugar cane.35 The 
activist group wanted these buildings preserved as a tribute to the area's history 
and its contribution to Taiwan's culture and economic development. Taiwan's 
historical preservation law, however, did not protect structures built under 
Japanese rule. As the KMT violently consolidated control over Taiwan in the 
late 1940s, it discouraged even discussing- much less valorizing or preserving-
relics of the Japanese colonial era.36 This situation reversed itself with 
democratization, when Japanese colonialism became a hot topic for scholarship 
and a common object of nostalgia.37 The changing status of colonialism in 
public discourse has led to movements to preserve Japanese-era structures on 
grounds other than simple age, such as historical importance, architectural 
quality, and local significance. The activist group I studied successfully mobil-
ized such arguments, convincing city administrators to extend historical status to 
the buildings despite the absence of a legal requirement to do so. 
The invocation of law was, thus, at best icing on a cake of otherwise 
appropriate social belonging. At worst, it could signal breakdown: a failure 
of social engagement; of social norms; of other, more legitimate, values. For 
instance, some violations of zoning ordinances in Taipei are so widespread as 
to be considered standard. Owners of top-story apartments routinely build 
extra living space on the roof even though zoning laws strictly prohibit it. 
34 See ibid. 
3; On the role bf sugar in Taiwan's history, see Jack Williams, "Sugar: the sweetener in Taiwan's 
development" in Ronald G. Knapp (ed.), China's Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical 
Geography of Taiwan (University Press of Hawaii, 1980), pp. 2.19-51. 
36 Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence. Tensions between the local population and 
the incoming mainlanders flared with the "2.-2.-8 Incident (Ererba shijian)" of February 2.8, 
1947, an island-wide protest or riot (depending on where one stands) that involved KMT troops 
killing thousands of Taiwanese, and particularly targeting elites educated in Japanese schools. 
Although the total number killed is not known, there is a "rough consensus among scholars [of] 
1o,ooo killed and 3o,ooo wounded": ibid, 83. 
37 Scholars at the recently founded Institute of Taiwan History in Academia Sinica, Taiwan's 
leading research institution, for instance, focus largely on the Japanese era. 
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(Condominium-style housing is the norm throughout urban Taiwan.) 
Unlicensed street stalls offering goods and services line many streets, generally 
acknowledged as having a claim on the space without any legal right to it. 
One of my informants, who ran a car wash by setting up her supplies and 
waiting for customers to pull into a parking space on an alley corner, once 
shook her head over a young man who had actually parked his car in the 
space: "Doesn't he know I'm running a business? Some people are really 
strange."38 Occasionally, a person would object to such informal use of 
space with a complaint on the city government's internet complaint board. 
When that happened, administrators would inform the objects of complaint 
that someone was unhappy, so that they could figure out who the complain-
ants might be and negotiate with them privately. What an anonymous 
complaint about a legal violation signaled to government administrators, in 
other words, was a breakdown in social relationships. A further complaint, 
however, pushed administrators to address the offending structure, lest the 
department itself became an object of complaint.39 
The proper role for government was thus not to neutrally enforce the law, 
but to act as a neutral broker for private parties' social relationships. If that did 
not resolve the situation, administrators would find themselves unpleasantly 
entangled with a botched social relationship. They would then have little 
choice but to take recourse to law.40 If law occupied the periphery of people's 
understandings of government, then, it was not so much because government 
was hopelessly corrupt, unresponsive, or disorganized.41 It was because, most 
people agreed, legality was not the proper focal point for government concern 
in the first place. 
WHY MARGINALIZE LAW? 
I want to return to the questions I attributed to David Engel at the beginning 
of this chapter. First, was administrators' distaste for law not best explained by 
38 "Ta buzhidao wo zaizuo shengyi rna? Youderen zhen qiguai." The young man, it turned out, 
had just returned from a year studying in England. 
39 Bernstein, The Social Life of Regulation, 948. 
40 Jeffrey Martin similarly explains how Taiwanese police routinely act as social peace brokers 
and push recalcitrants toward interpersonal negotiation even as they nominally enforce the 
law. Jeffrey T. Martin, ''A reasonable balance of law and sentiment: social order in democratic 
Taiwan from the policeman's point of view," Law 6 Society Review, 41 (2007), 665-cn. 
4' Taipei had its share of corruption, unresponsiveness, and disorganization, but these were not 
generally described in terms of legality. Rather, they too were discussed in terms of the social 
norms that were used to characterize other aspects of political life. 
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the potential restraints it imposed on their power? And second, wasn't a 
widespread societal distaste for law an instantiation of the same distaste we 
have found all over the world? The devaluation of legality in Taiwan is 
certainly reminiscent of the devaluation of litigation in Sander County and 
in northern Thailand that Engel himself has described.42 Yet seen within its 
sociohistorical context, it highlights important differences as well. These 
differences, in tum, illuminate the way that understanding the roles of law 
in society depends on historically informed, culturally embedded, and locally 
specific research (the sort that Engel himself does). 
The irrelevance of law to democratic governance in Taipei, for example, 
was probably exacerbated by the unpleasant associations law has in philosophy 
and political theory. Throughout most of Chinese philosophy, law has been 
presented as "punitive, coercive, and morally debased in comparison with the 
uplifting spiritual influence of ritual practices and human relationships.''43 
No etymological link connects legality with legitimacy in the style of Indo-
European languages. On the contrary, the only philosophical school to 
champion law as a source of governance, the Legalists, advocated for a strict, 
punishing government that kept people in line through "generous rewards 
and severe punishments" - an explicit challenge to the Confucian emphasis 
on modeled ethical conduct that did not gamer the Legalists a good reputa-
tion.44 In contemporary times, meanwhile, laws are often seen as foreign 
transplants best used for performing modernity before foreign audiences rather 
than for either ordering or expressing the social norms of Taiwan itself.45 
However, this attitude toward law did not necessarily place private parties at 
the mercy of government agents' whims, or subject them to dependence on 
government agents' largesse, as one might expect if the city were run by a 
political machine that enforced fealty through the distribution of opportun-
ities. On the contrary, one reason why administrators emphasized the import-
ance of consensus may have had to do with how they were themselves 
constantly involved in ongoing negotiations with various sectors of the public. 
The apparent impossibility of simply enforcing a law did not hold just for 
"" See Engel, The Oven Bird's Song, Engel, Globalization. 
43 Jane Kaufman Winn, "Relational practices and the marginalization of law: informal financial 
practices of small businesses in Taiwan," Law 6 Society Review, 28 (1994), 193-232, 200. 
44 Wing-tsit Chan (ed. and trans.), A Sourcebook on Chinese Philosophy (Princeton University 
Press, 1963), p. 251. 
45 Winn writes that her interviewees "routinely presumed that the invocation of law involved 
suppression and punishment and often dismissed the idea that law could empower participants 
in realizing their objectives": Winn, Relational Practices, p. 201. See also Bernstein, The Social 
Life of Regulation. 
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community activists whose demands found support in a zoning ordinance. 
Government administrators, too, often operated by trying to convince the 
people under their purview that accommodating a law or policy was a good 
thing for them to do.46 If law is somewhat meaningless in a number of places, 
then, the meaning of that meaninglessness can still be different. 
The process of convincing that administrators discussed, moreover, was 
typically not bilateral but multinodal. It did not starkly oppose a unified body 
of administrators to a unified contingent of the public, but often involved 
multiple sets of each. A typical meeting about the neighborhood park dis-
cussed in the previous section, for instance, involved representatives from the 
community activist group; the electric company; the newspaper headquar-
tered in the neighborhood, which had pledged some funding; the Taiwan 
Sugar Corporation, the formerly party state-owned enterprise whose status had 
become ambiguous with the disaggregation of party and state, and which 
owned the land at issue; the borough head, a neighborhood-level elected 
office independent of the city government bureaucracy; and several city 
government departments, each with its own policy orientations, personnel, 
and interest in the land. These groups were aligned and divergent in ways that 
were neither ali-or-nothing nor completely predictable. Each was also deeply 
integrated into multiple social spheres and institutions. And each had different 
amounts of, and different kinds of, power. 47 
This multiplicity of personnel, positions, and powers meant that the inevit-
ably long-term process of building consensus required flexibility and com-
promise on the part of all participants - both the subjects and the objects of 
government action. I do not mean to suggest that nobody lost out in the 
negotiations that characterized so much of the department's work. But there 
were a number of routes that could lead to political efficacy, and no one 
position that trumped all others. That meant that who would lose in any given 
instance was not necessarily predictable on the basis of easily discemable 
characteristics such as employment by government or control over economic 
resources. Government bureaucrats, in other words, were not in a strong 
position to simply impose whims or offer largesse; they too were negotiating 
parties, along with everyone else. If law was absent as an organizing force in 
political action in Taipei, then, it was not because some other single organiz-
ing force- such as party machinery- had muscled it out and stood in its stead. 
Rather, a plurality of organizing forces provided different people with different 
potential ways of getting things done. 
4
6 Bernstein, The Social Life of Regulation. 47 Ibid. 
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Moreover, disinterest in the law was a widely shared attitude. It was 
common to government employees, activists who made demands of the 
government, and wide swaths of the public at large. To be sure, the law cast 
a shadow in which people negotiated. But it cast that shadow from the 
periphery of the social. Where recourse to the law was efficacious, it usually 
indicated a breakdown in social functioning and a breach of social norms. 
So when bureaucrats avoided, ignored, or maligned the law, they did not 
violate local values; they enacted them. 
Finally, and crucially: Among the people I met, rejecting legal process did 
not imply that people should accept injustices or refrain from making 
demands of others. On the contrary. The activists with whom I worked knew 
that a favorable zoning ordinance would not suffice to mandate the creation of 
a park; they successfully pressed for the park using more acceptable strategies. 
They knew that historical preservation law did not extend to the neighbor-
hood's Japanese-era buildings; they successfully demanded preservation 
through other means. Administrators similarly did not connect the weakness 
of law to a diminution of demands from the public. While administrators did 
not always enjoy negotiating with activists who made demands or landowners 
who resisted government policy, neither did they suggest that such actions 
were illegitimate.48 
Forgoing recourse to the law, then, did not mean "lumping." Nor did 
people think it should. Engel found that his Thai participants cited religious 
convictions, grounded in Thai Buddhism, as a reason to refrain from making 
demands on others.49 Buddhism is an important part of social life in Taiwan, 5° 
but the people with whom I spoke never invoked religion to suggest that 
someone should not be recompensed for an injury or should refrain from 
making a demand. In Sander County, Engel found that "insiders" cited social 
norms of righteous self-sufficiency to censure those who used law to seek 
redress for their injuriesY Self-sufficiency was not a strong value among the 
people I knew in Taiwan, who were much more likely to figure a righteous 
48 Moreover, when law did force the government's hand, it was likely to be at the urging of one 
private party who considered himself injured by another, as with the internet complaint system 
for zoning violations. 
49 Engel, supra note :1.. David M. Engel, "Globalization and the decline of legal consciousness: 
torts, ghosts, and karma in Thailand," Law 6 Social Inquiry, 30 (zoo5), 469-514-
so Robert P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan (Westview 
Press, 1999). Taiwan is home to a syncretic mix of religious traditions, but Buddhism is 
sufficiently well integrated into everyday life that just about every neighborhood has at least one 
restaurant catering to Buddhist-style vegetarians, who refrain from eating animal flesh as well as 
garlic and ginger. 
5• Engel, supra note 2. Ol!en Bird's Song. 
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person as deeply embedded in ongoing relations of mutual aid and mutual 
obligation. Although social norms played a key part in people's distaste for law, 
they did not militate complacency. In fact, they often facilitated the opposite, 
as activists' deep connections to community, locality, and nation served to 
justify their demands. 
Like those whom Engel studied in Sander County and Thailand, the 
people in my study could be both suspicious and dismissive of law. But the 
flavor of their distaste was different, specific to the interacting strands of their 
historical background, their social values, and their political experiences. 
Just as importantly, the effects of that distaste differed too. Engel's Sander 
County residents disapproved of those who made demands of others -
demands that would have been legitimate within the legal system but were 
not legitimated by local values. In my research sites, in contrast, local social 
values provided more useful avenues for making demands of others than 
did law. 
What does this suggest for the study oflaw in society? A range of scholarship 
has amply demonstrated that people everywhere have a complicated, often 
unhappy, relation to law. But it also suggests that, as a sociolegal Tolstoy might 
tell us, each unhappy relation to law is unhappy in its own way. It emerges 
from particular histories of social, political, and normative organization. And it 
fits into particular constellations of practice - that is, ways of getting 
things done. 
Part of evaluating legal consciousness in any particular place involves 
evaluating broader social values and norms. But it also involves considering 
the other ways people have of doing things they might sometimes do through 
law, such as resolving disputes, pressing demands, and legitimating political 
claims. In a way, this recognition diminishes the centrality of law to a socio-
legal study. Law turns out to be just one of numerous methods available for 
getting things done: one song weaving in and out of other songs, sung by 
other birds. 
